(Robert Gauthier/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images)

At a quick glance at the box score, Luka Doncic’s performance against the Phoenix Suns looked like the one bright spot on a bleak night for the Lakers, who were blown out 125:108 at home. He scored 38 points on 57.7 percent shooting from the field. But a deeper look tells a different story: Doncic turned the ball over 9 times, took 27 shots from the field compared to an average of 22.5, and handed out only 5 assists (his average is 9.2).

More importantly, he was basically the only Laker with anything going on offensively. LeBron James finished with 10 points on 3 of 10 from the field, Austin Reaves had 16 on 6 of 12 (compared to his average of 16.6 attempts), and Rui Hachimura (a 14-point scorer on 10.5 field goal attempts per game) took just one shot (!) in 23 minutes and did not score.

One of the main reasons Doncic took more on himself but could not get others involved is the Suns’ ball-screen coverage. Usually, teams switch against Doncic’s ball screens, which allows him to attack big men off the dribble, put the defense in a blender, force rotations and closeouts, and create good looks for teammates. Another coverage, one the Lakers prefer, is to trap the ball, like Jason Kidd did as Mavs coach in the earlier Lakers vs. Dallas game. Doncic distributed the ball, finished with 11 assists, took 18 shots from the field (35 points), and the Lakers won 129-119.

The Suns’ ball screen coverage, however, might sound counterintuitive: they invited Doncic to drive to the rim. Well, maybe that is a bit of an exaggeration, but they guarded him with a mix of two coverages built on the same principle - Weak and Ice (top side). Jordan Ott, the Suns’ rookie coach, tried to push Luka to his weaker hand, left, when he handled the ball at the top of the key and in the middle (weak coverage), and sent him toward the sideline when he operated on the wing (ice coverage).

Luka’s primary defenders, mainly Royce O’Neale and Dillon Brooks, stayed attached when he drove, making every step difficult. If he did beat them, the Slovenian Point guard ran into Mark Williams, located in a relatively high drop coverage. Williams, who has the highest standing reach in the NBA, would, when necessary, make a very late switch with Doncic’s on-ball defender, right at the rim. One obvious advantage of this coverage is that it allows the ball handler to get relatively deep into the paint. Once he starts looking for his own shot, the passing angles out to the perimeter become much tougher.

By tempting Luka to drive, the Suns eliminated the need for the kind of rotations that usually put a defense in a blender. The defenders guarding the corner shooters pinched in to help, but without completely losing their own men. The ball hardly ever reached the players spaced in the perimeter, like Reaves, LeBron, and especially Hachimura. The only one of Doncic’s assists to a perimeter player came in the first quarter, on a pass out of a post-up to Reaves. His other 3 assists went to players in the paint - 2 to Ayton and 1 to LaRavia - and the fifth, which was not really a classic assist, came on a pass to Maxi Kleber in the corner, who drove to the basket and created his own shot.

Yes, the Lakers were on the second night of a back-to-back and looked tired and flat. And no, not every team has the defensive tools that Phoenix does (the Clippers - we’re talking to you). But what should worry the Lakers is that the team that most resembles Phoenix in terms of its guard defense and the length it can put at the rim - only much better - is the Oklahoma City Thunder, the reigning NBA champions. If the Lakers want to be real contenders, they have to solve this defensive approach. They are likely to see it again in much more important stages of the season.