Before diving into the Houston Rockets’ offense and their championship prospects next season with the addition of Kevin Durant, let’s establish one fundamental truth: playbooks don’t win championships.

Yes, coaches love to trade compliments about a clever baseline out-of-bounds set, and commentators can spend time breaking down a creative play after timeout. Don’t worry, I’ll break down set plays too. But at the end of the day, a thick playbook is not what separates champions from the rest. Championships are built on talent, defensive identity, mental toughness, and a buy-in to offensive principles.

Take the reigning champions, the Oklahoma City Thunder. Their playbook has some variety, but their main action boiled down to something simple: Shai Gilgeous-Alexander attacking, finishing, or kicking out to shooters. Effective, efficient, Winning. Or think back to Rick Carlisle ,one of the most respected X’s and O’s minds in basketball, who won his lone title by empowering Jason Kidd to control the offense on the floor. Carlisle nearly won a championship again with Indiana this past season, running a “random offense” rather than a scripted one.

Ime Udoka, to his credit, has never been defined by a massive playbook. His reputation is rooted in discipline and defensive toughness. His Celtics made the Finals with a leaner offensive scheme than his predecessor, Brad Stevens. And in Houston, Udoka’s Rockets have made steady progress, finishing second in the West last season behind a defense that ranked fourth in the league (110.8 points per 100 possessions).

Offensively, the fairest description of Udoka’s scheme is “simple.” And that’s not necessarily a criticism. But next year he’ll coach the most talented scorer of his career, Kevin Durant (apologies to Jayson Tatum), and adjustments will be required to maximize Durant’s gifts.

The first area that demands attention: passing. The Rockets were dead last in passes per game (262.3). By contrast, Golden State, who eliminated Houston in the first round-ranked first with 333.2 passes per game. The difference was glaring in Game 7: while the Warriors moved the ball, attacked closeouts, and generated clean looks, the Rockets often stalled, reluctant to share the ball.

Now, a high pass volume isn’t a prerequisite for winning. Indiana led the league in passing during both the regular season and playoffs, while the champion Thunder ranked near the bottom (24th regular season, 14th playoffs). But Houston’s Game 7 possessions revealed deeper problems: not just limited passing, but flawed spacing and questionable decision-making.

The Rockets’ toughest minutes came during the 2nd quarter. against Steve Kerr’s shifting zone, toggling between a 1:3:1 and a 2-3. It was a smart adjustment against a Houston team ranked 21st in three-point percentage (35.3%).

One possession highlights the issue. Alperen Şengün isolates in the high post against Brandin Podziemski, a matchup within the zone (as Podziemski covers the high post) Houston should exploit. But poor spacing undermines the advantage: Amen Thompson crowds the dunker spot (more on that later), and Tari Eason drifts toward the paint instead of spacing to the corner. Draymond Green reads the floor easily and stops the play. Meanwhile, Fred VanVleet - Houston’s best shooter in the series - waits unacknowledged in the corner.

It happened again. Şengün in the high post, this time against Buddy Hield. Again, spacing collapses: Steven Adams camps in the dunker spot, Jabari Smith floats in no-man’s land between paint and corner before fighting for the offensive board, and the Warriors clog the lane. Another missed layup.

Even when Şengün passed, his decision-making faltered. With Jimmy Butler covering the post this time, Sengun bypassed a passing option to Dillon Brooks, located in the corner, and instead forced a pass into traffic to Thompson. Draymond picked it off with ease.

But poor decision making against the zone was not limited to Şengün. One of the most basic principles in attacking a zone defense - and truthfully, in attacking man to man as well - is to generate long closeouts that force defenders to cover more ground. In this particular possession, however, Amen Thompson and Jalen Green repeatedly attacked the exact same defensive gap, not once but three times in succession. By doing so, they ignored other viable passing options, most notably Fred VanVleet spotted up on the wing.

The result - Golden State’s defenders didn’t have to rotate; the closeouts they faced were short and entirely manageable. Instead of forcing the defense into difficult recoveries, the possession ended with a contested Jalen Green three-pointer, challenged simultaneously by two Warriors defenders.

Thompson is a fascinating case. Defensively, he’s already All-NBA caliber, earning First Team All-Defense in his second season. In transition, he’s devastating-a one-man fast break with Giannis-like explosion and a better handle. This spectacular finish speaks for itself.

The talent is undeniable. But in the halfcourt, he remains a liability. His 27.5% three-point shooting doesn’t put him in the same conversation as Ben Simmons, who famously made just 5 threes in his entire career. But Like Simmons, Udoka’s solution for Thompson’s shooting woes has been to park Thompson in the dunker spot, essentially turning him into a small-ball center on offense.

The problem? Even there, he’s uncomfortable. vs Warriors zone, he receives the ball without looking at the rim, dribbling away from the basket instead of toward it-a move eerily reminiscent of Simmons. The possession ends in Eason’s turnover.

Durant’s arrival changes the calculus. His shooting, decision-making, and ability to draw defensive gravity instantly upgrade Houston’s spacing. He gives the Rockets an end-of-clock iso weapon and a credible floor spacer.

Durant is steadier, more efficient, and quite simply a massive upgrade over Jalen Green. In the second half of Game 7, Green was little more than an afterthought in the Rockets’ offense, relegated to the corner while VanVleet and Sengun handled the key decisions. It felt as though Udoka already knew those were Green’s final minutes in a Rockets uniform.

But even Durant can’t mask everything.The roster construction still lacks a true second guard. Rookie Reed Sheppard, at 6’2, may struggle to pair effectively with 6’0 feet VanVleet. That leaves Houston reliant on Durant and VanVleet as primary creators, with Thompson’s shooting limitations hanging over most lineups.

Udoka doesn’t need a bigger playbook; he needs sharper adherence to principles. Passing. Spacing. Decision-making. If the Rockets want to elevate from a defensive powerhouse to a true contender, those are the habits they must master. Durant gives them a chance for contention - but it won’t be enough without structural offensive growth.